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RESTRICTING THE FLOW OF FUNDS FROM U.S.
CHARITIES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS-A PROPOSAL
Mindy Herzfeld*
Numerous news reports since September 11, 2001 have reviewed the short-
comings within the intelligence system that may have led to the failure to pre-
vent the terrorist attacks on the United States. In response, oversight committees
have focused on the need for revamping our intelligence operations and agen-
cies.' In contrast, there has been relatively little attention paid to the extent to
which the U.S. government and unknowing U.S. taxpayers have actively sup-
ported the types of terrorist groups that orchestrated the terror attacks. The
operation under tax-exempt status in the United States of organizations that
actively fund terrorist activities abroad, has meant that the U.S. government, and
all U.S. taxpayers, indirectly finance such organizations and the recipients of
their funding dollars.
This paper argues that the Service should take a more active stance in denying
tax exemption to organizations that finance terrorist activities abroad. The paper
explores the well-established principle that organizations granted U.S. tax-
exemption must act consistently with national public policy, and the application
of that principle to charitable organizations that send monies overseas. To foster
that policy, the Service should apply special guidelines to charitable organiza-
tions that channel contributions abroad, similar to the special guidelines in effect
for tax-exempt private schools. In addition, legislative changes should be made
to advance such a goal in order to provide additional legal support for necessary
changes in the Service's policy.
Part I of this Article reviews some of the commonly advanced theories as to
the purpose of the tax exemption provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (the
Code), and the reliance on such theories by the courts and by the Service to deny
tax exemption to organizations operating in furtherance of an illegal purpose and
organizations acting contrary to national public policy. Part II summarizes some
of the publicly available information on the links between charitable organiza-
tions raising funds in the United States and individuals and organizations the
U.S. government has classified as engaged in or supporting terrorism. Part III
*Barnard College, B.A. 1990; Yale Law School, J.D. 1995; Georgetown Univ. Law Center,
LL.M. 2003. The author would like to thank Professor Michael Sanders of the Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center for his support and guidance in the writing of this article.
'See, e.g., Dana Milbank & Walter Pincus, Kissinger To Lead 9/11 Panel, WASH. POST, Nov. 28,
2002, at AO1; Jeanne Cummings, Kissinger To Lead Probe of Sept. 11, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2002,
at A4. On the topic of oversight committee responses shortly after September 11, see, e.g., Alison
Mitchell & Todd S. Purdum, Probe Into Intelligence Lapses Brewing; McCain Pushes for Special
Panel, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 22, 2001, at 9.
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ends with concrete suggestions for a change in policy to prevent the continued
operation of such organizations in the United States under tax-exempt status,
including changes to the Code, changes to the Form 990, and the issuance of
published guidance by the Service.
I. TAX EXEMPTION, CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD
A. Background
A number of provisions of the Code interact to create the regime that governs
entities claiming exemption from U.S. federal income taxes. Section 501(a)2
grants an exemption from income taxes to, among others, organizations de-
scribed in section 501(c)(3). Section 501(c)(3) includes:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or education purposes ... no part of the net earnings of which inures to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influ-
ence legislation ... and which does not participate in, or intervene in ... any
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public
office.
Section 170 provides a deduction for a charitable contribution made to a
corporation, trust, or community chest, fund or foundation created or organized
in the United States organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international
amateur sports competition or for the prevention of cruelty to children or ani-
mals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual.3
The special tax exemptions provided to charitable organizations, which have
been a part of U.S. tax law since 1894, 4 generally are considered to be derived
from similar special grants of privilege found in the English law of trusts and the
Statute of Elizabeth of 1601.1 The English income tax laws have provided for
tax exemption for charitable organizations since the nineteenth century.6 Con-
2Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended.
3I.R.C. § 170(c)(2).
4See Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509 (exempting from a two percent tax imposed
on the net profits of a corporation, "corporations, companies, or associations organized and con-
ducted solely for charitable, religious or educational purposes."). See, e.g., BRUCE R. HOPrINS, THE
LAW OF TAx-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (7th ed. 1998) at 12 n.56 (describing exemption in the Tariff Act
of 1894 for nonprofit charitable, religious, and educational institutions). See also 55 Cong. Rec.
6728 (1917) (regarding the enactment of the deduction for charitable contributions).
5See Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. 4654 (1860); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S.
574, 588 (1983) [hereinafter Bob Jones Univ.]; Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz. I, c. 4 (1601).
6See 26 CONG. REC. 585-86 (1894) (summarizing survey taken of income tax laws of the United
Kingdom by the U.S. Department of State).
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gressional debates from the early days of our modem tax system indicate near
unanimity of thought that organizations involved in the public good, rather than
the pursuit of private wealth, should be exempt from the tax burdens imposed on
profit-seeking. As Senator Bacon stated in 1909, in connection with introducing
the exemption from the income tax for charitable organizations:
In this partial levy of tax, where we are seeking to reach a certain class of
wealth, we very properly except those institutions and those enterprises which
have no element of personal gain in them whatever, and which are devoted
exclusively to the relief of suffering, to the alleviation of our people, and to all
things which commend themselves to every charitable and just impulse.'
The tax exemption granted to charitable organizations most often has been
justified on the grounds that such organizations provide a benefit to the general
public and serve a public purpose.8 Congress has also explained the reason for
the exemption on the grounds that the government receives a financial benefit in
exchange for giving up its right to collect tax receipts. In proposing a deduction
for charitable contributions in 1917, Senator Hollis argued that:
For every dollar that a man contributes for these public charities, educational,
scientific, or otherwise, the public gets 100 per cent; it is all devoted to that
purpose. If it were undertaken to support such institutions through the Federal
Government or local governments and the taxes were imposed for the amount
they would only get the percentage, 5 per cent, 10 per cent, 20 per cent, or 40
per cent, as the case might be.9
The quid pro quo justification for the tax exemption provides a partial expla-
nation for why the Code denies a deduction for contributions to charities not
organized in the United States.'
744 CONG. REc. 4150 (1909).
'See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 588.
955 CONG. REC. 6728 (1917). This type of thought also is evident in the passage of the Revenue
Act of 1938, § 101, Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, 52 Stat. 448 (1938). The accompanying House
report states that the exemption "is based on the theory that the Government is compensated for the
loss of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which would otherwise have to be met by
appropriations from other public funds .. " H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., at 19 (3d Sess. 1938)
(quoted in Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 590).
"
5See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(A). Nevertheless, recent commentators, and even the Service, have ques-
tioned the application of the quid pro quo theory in this context. For example, it is well accepted that
contributions to a domestic organization may qualify for a tax deduction even if the organization
sends the contributed funds overseas. See Harvey P. Dale, Foreign Charities, 48 TAX LAW. 657, 660
(1995). See also Reg. § 1. 170A-8(a)(1) ("A charitable contribution by an individual may be deduct-
ible even though all, or some portion, of the funds of the organization may be used in foreign
countries for charitable or educational purposes."); Rev. Rul. 1974-229, 1974-1 C.B. 142 (holding
that an organization which otherwise meets the requirements of section 509(a)(3) qualifies as an
organization described in section 509(a)(3) where it supports a foreign organization that otherwise
meets the requirements of section 509(a)). Moreover, commentators have questioned the quid pro
quo analysis altogether. See Dale, Foreign Charities, 48 TAX LAW. at 660-61 ("there is no indication
that the tax exemption, afforded since the end of the nineteenth century, was predicated on the quid
pro quo rationale."), quoting ADLER, HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF TAX EXEMPnON OF CHARTABLE INsrrru-
TIONS (1922); Harry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corpo-
rate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981).
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If "[c]haritable exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity
confers a public benefit-a benefit which the society or the community may not
itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and advances the work
of public institutions already supported by tax revenues,"" the converse of this
proposition also is true: organizations that do not serve a public benefit, but are a
detriment to society, may not qualify for tax exemption.
The Supreme Court stated in its 1877 decision, Ould v. Washington Hospital
for Foundlings, that charitable use "where neither law nor public policy forbids,
may be applied to almost any thing that tends to promote the well-doing and
well-being of social man."' 2 Thus, organizations that serve an illegal purpose, or
that act contrary to established public policy, cannot qualify as charitable. The
Restatement (Second) of Trusts states that "[a] trust for a purpose the accom-
plishment of which is contrary to public policy, although not forbidden by law,
is invalid."' 3 The principle that "the purpose of a charitable trust may not be
illegal or violate established public policy,"' 4 has been extended to the law of
tax-exempt organizations.
Consistent with the above, both the Service and the courts generally have
denied tax exemption to organizations that serve an illegal purpose. In Church of
Scientology v. Commissioner,5 the Tax Court upheld the denial of tax exemp-
tion to the Church of Scientology, partly on the grounds that the Church had
violated public policy by conspiring for almost a decade to defraud the U.S.
government by preventing the Service from collecting taxes due. 6 The court
found that "that criminal manipulation of the IRS to maintain its tax exemption
(and the exemption of affiliated churches) was a crucial and purposeful element
of petitioner's financial planning."' 7 In Revenue Ruling 1975-384,"8 the Service
denied tax exemption to an organization that was primarily engaged in sponsor-
"Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983).
'
2 Ould v. Washington Hosp. for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303, 311 (1877) (emphasis added).
3RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 377 (1959). See also AUSTIN W. ScOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER,
ScoTr ON TRUSTS § 377 (4th ed. 1987) (explaining that "[a] trust cannot be created for a purpose
which is illegal. The purpose is illegal if the trust property is to be used for an object which is in
violation of the criminal law, or if the trust tends to induce the commission of crime, or if the
accomplishment of the purpose is otherwise against public policy."); Lockwood's Estate, 41 D.&C.
621 (1941).
4See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591. See also Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1159
(D.D.C.), summarily aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) ("All charitable trusts,
educational or otherwise, are subject to the requirement that the purpose of the trust may not be
illegal or contrary to public policy.").
583 T.C. 381 (1984), aff'don other grounds, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987).
1683 T.C. at 466.
1783 T.C. at 504-05. "[T]he Government's interest in ferreting out crime is not the only interest at
stake here. The Government also has an interest in not subsidizing criminal activity. Were we to
sustain petitioner's exemption, we would in effect be sanctioning petitioner's right to conspire to
thwart the IRS at taxpayers' expense." Id. at 506.
111975-2 C.B. 204. Cf In re Mealy's Estate, 204 P.2d 971 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949) (upholding
bequest to nonprofit publishing foundation where purpose of foundation was not the violent over-
throw of the U.S. government, despite expressions of sympathy for Communist Party).
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 56, No. 4
RESTRICTING THE FLOW OF FUNDS FROM U.S. CHARITIES
ing anti-war protest demonstrations and nonviolent action projects, on the ground
that such activities "encourage[d] the commission of criminal acts," and such an
illegal purpose could not be consistent with charitable ends.19 In one of the most
important cases in this area, Bob Jones University v. United States, the Supreme
Court, in denying tax-exempt status to an educational institution that engaged in
racial discrimination, stated that:
to warrant exemption under section 501(c)(3), an institution must fall within a
category specified in that section and must demonstrably serve and be in har-
mony with the public interest. The institution's purpose must not be so at odds
with the common community conscience as to undermine any public benefit
that might otherwise be conferred."
As the above authorities demonstrate, to grant tax exemption to organizations
that engage in activities that violate public policy would subvert the underlying
purpose and historical underpinnings of the tax-exempt provisions of our income
tax system.
B. Charitable Purpose, National Public Policy, and Race Discrimination in
Private Schools
The impropriety of having the benefits of tax exemption support institutions
that operate contrary to the law or to national public policy has been most
extensively discussed, and most vigorously applied, in the context of the tax-
exempt status of private schools that discriminate on the basis of race.
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education2'
and subsequent orders by local courts mandating the desegregation of the nation's
public schools, racially segregated private schools rapidly began opening up in
the Southern states. In 1970, a group of African-American parents and their
minor children attending public school in Mississippi sued to enjoin the Trea-
sury Department from recognizing the tax-exempt status of private schools in
Mississippi with racially-discriminatory admissions policies.22 The U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction to the plain-
tiffs in Green v. Kennedy,23 enjoining the Service from recognizing private schools
in Mississippi as tax-exempt "unless they have affirmatively determined on the
basis of adequate investigation that the applicant school does not discriminate
against Negroes in its admissions policy."24 In response to the court's orders, the
9As additional support for its conclusion, the Service alluded to congressional policy that tax-
exemption should be granted to organizations that relieve the government of a financial burden.
20461 U.S. 574. 592 (1983).
21347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, appeal dismissed sub nom., Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S.
956 (1970).
2 3
1d.
24 1d. at I 131.
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Service issued two releases in 1970 in which, reversing its earlier position, it
stated that it can "no longer legally justify allowing tax-exempt status . . . to
private schools which practice racial discrimination."25 Subsequent to the Ser-
vice releases, the district court issued its final order in the Green case and
enjoined the Service from approving tax-exempt status for any school in Missis-
sippi that did not publicly maintain a policy of nondiscrimination.26 The order
stated that "the Code requires the denial and elimination of Federal tax exemp-
tions for racially discriminatory private schools and of Federal income tax de-
ductions for contributions to such schools."27
In response to the court's ruling in Green, the Service issued published guid-
ance adopting the court's position. In Revenue Ruling 1971-447,28 the Service
ruled that a private school without a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to
students does not qualify for exemption under section 501(c)(3). The Service
defined a racially nondiscriminatory policy as:
meaning that the school admits the students of any race to all the rights, privi-
leges, programs, and activities generally accorded or made available to students
at that school and that the school does not discriminate on the basis of race in
administration of its educational policies, admissions policies, scholarship and
loan programs, and athletic and other school-administered programs.2 9
The Service acknowledged that the operation of such a school was not prohib-
ited by federal law. Nevertheless, based on the existence of a national policy to
discourage racial discrimination in education, the Service concluded that a school
not having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students may not be consid-
ered charitable within the common law concepts reflected in sections 170 and
501(c)(3) and, accordingly, could not qualify as an exempt organization under
section 501(c)(3).
In 1982, the Supreme Court reviewed the issue of the tax-exempt status of
racially discriminatory private schools in the cases of Bob Jones University v.
United States and Goldsboro Christian Schools v. United States.30 In Bob Jones
University, the plaintiff Bob Jones University was a non-profit religious and
educational institution "dedicated to the teaching and propagation of its funda-
mentalist Christian religious beliefs."'" As a result of such religious beliefs, Bob
Jones University prohibited interracial marriage or dating by its students. Plain-
tiff Goldsboro Christian Schools was a non-profit primary and high school, also
"giving special emphasis to the Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the
Holy scriptures."32 Goldsboro's Christian beliefs led it to maintain a racially
'See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574, 578 (1983) (quoting the Service's release issued July 10,
1970).26Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971).2
1Id. at 1156.
211971-2 C.B. 230.
29
1d.
3 0Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574 (1982).311d. at 580.
321d. at 583.
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discriminatory admissions policy. In upholding the Service's denial of tax-
exemption to the two organizations because of their racially discriminatory ad-
mission policies, the Supreme Court approved the doctrine enunciated by the
Service in Revenue Ruling 1971-447:
There can thus be no question that the interpretation of § 170 and § 501(c)(3)
announced by the IRS in 1970 was correct .... It would be wholly incompat-
ible with the concepts underlying tax exemption to grant the benefit of tax-
exempt status to racially discriminatory educational entities.... Whatever may
be the rationale for such private schools' policies, and however sincere the
rationale may be, racial discrimination in education is contrary to public policy.
Racially discriminatory educational institutions cannot be viewed as conferring
a public benefit within the "charitable" concept ... or within the congressional
intent underlying § 170 and § 501(c)(3).33
The Court agreed that in order to qualify for tax-exempt status under the
Code, an organization must meet the "common-law standards of charity-namely,
that an institution seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not
be contrary to established public policy.
' 34
Acting upon the impetus provided by the court decisions described above, the
Service in 1975 issued general guidelines governing the procedures private schools
are required to follow with respect to a policy of non-racial discrimination, in
order to ensure their tax-exempt status. Revenue Procedure 1975-5035 states that
in order to qualify as an organization exempt from federal income tax, a school
"must show affirmatively both that it has adopted a racially nondiscriminatory
policy as to students that is made known to the general public and that since the
adoption of that policy it has operated in a bona fide manner in accordance
therewith." Revenue Procedure 1975-50 also sets out detailed informational and
record keeping requirements that an organization is required to maintain. They
include records indicating the racial composition of the student body, faculty,
and staff, records sufficient to document that scholarship and other financial
assistance is awarded on a racially nondiscriminatory basis, and copies of all
brochures, catalogues, and advertising dealing with student admission, programs
and scholarships. The focal point of the Revenue Procedure, however, is the
requirement that all schools adopt a policy of non-discrimination and that policy
must be publicized to "all segments of the general community served by the
school. ' 36 The non-discriminatory policy must be included in the school's char-
ter, bylaws, or other governing document, and a statement of the school's ra-
cially non-discriminatory policy is required to be included in all brochures and
catalogues dealing with student admissions, programs, and scholarships.
Compliance with the Service guidelines is necessary for private schools to ob-
tain and maintain tax-exempt status.
331d. at 595-96.341d. at 586.
351975-2 C.B. 587.361d"
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With respect to private schools and racial discrimination, the Service has
vigorously applied the common law notion that to qualify as charitable, organi-
zations must operate and promote policies consistent with the national public
policy. The courts, including the Supreme Court, overwhelmingly have upheld
and ratified this Service policy and approved the application of the common law
doctrine to the Service enforcement of sections 501 (c)(3) and 170.
II. TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND TAX EXEMPTION
A. Charities Engaged in Supporting Terrorism
Organizations that currently engage in the financing of terrorist activities via
their status as U.S. tax-exempt organizations pose a threat to the public good,
and to elementary justice, no less serious than that posed by racially discrimina-
tory private schools." Charitable organizations that engage in such suspect ac-
tivities form a not-insignificant part of the U.S. non-profit world. A 1996
report prepared by the CIA states that "approximately one-third of ... Islamic
[Non-Governmental Organizations] support terrorist groups or employ individu-
als who are suspected of having terrorist connections."38 The following discus-
sion demonstrates the nature and magnitude of the problem of financing of
terrorist organizations by U.S. tax-exempt organizations.39
The Tax Court has stated that:
[o]rganizations qualifying for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) are
doubly rewarded. Not only do they not have to pay taxes, but they also stand in
a better position to attract income since taxpayers who contribute to section
501(c)(3) organizations are permitted by section 170(c)(2) to deduct the amount
of their contributions on their Federal tax returns. 40
In practical terms, this means that U.S. taxpayers effectively subsidize the
work of tax-exempt terrorist-financing organizations to the tune of approxi-
mately 30% of the dollars such organizations raise in the United States,4 in
addition to the tax benefits afforded to the organizations themselves. 42
7See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983).
31CIA Report is quoted in Glenn Simpson, U.S. Knew of Terrorist, Charity Ties, WALL ST. J., May
9, 2003, at A2.
3'See generally, Glenn R. Simpson, Intricate Web: Tracing the Money, Terror Investigators Run
Into Mr. Qadi, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2002, at A l; Steven Emerson, PATRIOT Act Oversight:
Investigating Patterns of Terrorist Fundraising, Fund-Raising Methods and Procedures for Interna-
tional Terrorist Organizations House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations (Feb. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Steven Emerson); Matthew
A. Levitt, Senior Fellow in Terrorism Studies, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Charitable and Humanitarian Organizations in the Network of International Terrorist Financing,
United States Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance, Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Matthew A. Levitt).
4 Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381, 505 n.75 (1987).
4 Assuming donors are subject to, on average, a 30% income tax rate.
421t generally is well accepted that the tax benefits and deductions afforded tax-exempt entities
may be equated to direct or indirect governmental support. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Repre-
sentation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1982) ("Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of
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Two organizations that have had their assets frozen by the U.S. government,
the Global Relief Foundation (Global Relief) and the Holy Land Foundation,
were responsible for raising close to $20 million in the U.S. in 2001.11 Global
Relief raised more than $5 million in the United States last year," while the
Holy Land Foundation's total revenue exceeded $13 million. A network of 11
charities based in Virginia, which includes the International Institute of Islamic
Thought (1ilT), raised approximately $21.2 million between 1998 and 2001.15
These organizations have been alleged by NATO to be "involved in planning
attacks against targets in the U.S.A. and Europe"46 and to act as fronts for al-
Qaeda and other terrorist organizations (Global Relief);47 to engage in fundraising
activities for the militant Palestinian group Hamas (the Holy Land Foundation)48
with the monies being used to recruit suicide bombers;4 9 and in the case of the
HlIT, tied to Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas, as well as to al-Qaeda.5 °
The Virginia network of which the ILT was a part also is linked to the
Muslim World League and the International Islamic Relief Organization, both of
which have "been probed a number of times over the years for links to terror-
ism."'5' The International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), with offices in
Northern Virginia, allegedly has links to al-Qaeda, and its offices were raided by
the U.S. government in March, 2002.52 The IIRO has been alleged to be
subsidy that is administered through the tax system. A tax exemption has much the same effect as a
cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its income. Deductible
contributions are similar to cash grants of the amount of a portion of the individual's contribu-
tions."). See generally STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDI-
TURES (1973). For a more nuanced discussion of this complex subject, see, e.g., Linda Sugin, Tax
Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 407 (1999).
43John Mintz, From Veil of Secrecy, Portraits of U.S. Prisoners Emerge, WASH. POST, Mar. 15,
2002, at A03.
"Hearings, supra note 39 (testimony of Matthew A. Levitt).
45Christopher H. Schmitt, Joshua Kurlantzick and Philip Smucker, When Charity Goes Awry, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 29, 2001, at 35.
"Glenn R. Simpson and Daniel Pearl, Agents Raid U.S. Offices of Two Islamic Charities, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 17, 2001, at B7.
47Hearings, supra note 39 (testimony of Matthew A. Levitt). The Bosnian government has re-
leased a report tying Global Relief to the Taibah International Aid Association-an organization
that, according to the report, has links to ai-Qaeda and may have been engaged in terrorist financing.
See Glenn R. Simpson, Report Links Charity to an al-Qaeda Front, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2002, at
A4.
"Hamas has claimed responsibility for many suicide bombing attacks on Israeli civilians. See
Glenn R. Simpson, Hesitant Agents: Why the FBI Took Nine Years to Shut Group It Tied to Terror,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2002, at AI (detailing connections between the Holy Land Foundation and
Hamas).
491d.
50Schmitt, Kurlantzick and Smucker, supra note 45. An employee of lilT allegedly provided bin
Laden with satellite phone equipment for his operations. See Hearings, supra note 39 (testimony of
Matthew A. Levitt) ("'It was clear that [he] had ties to terrorist organizations,' said an Immigration
and Naturalization Service official who was present at his arrest.").
5 Schmitt, Kurlantzick and Smucker, supra note 45. See also Judith Miller, A Nation Challenged:
The Money Trail, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at section A, page A.
52Miller, supra note 51; Simpson, supra note 40. For more information on the alleged activities of
these organizations, see Hearings, supra note 39 (testimony of Matthew A. Levitt).
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"[f]oremost among charities tied to Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda,"53 and also
has been tied to the Abu Sayyaf Islamic group, which operates in the Philip-
pines, 4 and to a failed plot to destroy two U.S. diplomatic missions in India.5 In
addition, the IIRO has been associated with a company called BMI Inc.56 In
September 1988, a former accountant of BMI tied the money that he was trans-
ferring overseas on behalf of BMI to the financing of embassy bombings in
Africa that had taken place a month earlier. 7
Many of these organizations are related in ways that make it difficult for
investigators to trace the flow of funds between and among different groups. For
example, in 1991, a Mr. Qadi, an investor in BMI, transferred $820,000 through
one of his companies from a Swiss bank account to the Quranic Literacy Insti-
tute, a Chicago-based organization. The U.S. government has alleged that the
Quranic Institute "lent substantial assistance, through means of repeated and
possibly illegal subterfuge and misrepresentation, to a man who is an admitted
operative of Hamas." Mohammad Salah, an employee of the Quranic Literary
Institute, was arrested in Israel in 1993 "with a large sum of cash and a cache of
notes describing meetings with various Hamas cells," and later pled guilty in an
Israeli court "to being a top Hamas operative involved in raising money for the
terror group." 58 A 1995 confession by Mr. Salah stated that while in Chicago "in
the early 1990s, he trained recruits to work with 'basic chemical materials for
the preparation of bombs and explosives,' as well as various toxins."5 9 Mr. Salah
has also been identified with the Taibah International Aid Association, another
Islamic organization with alleged links to terrorist groups,6° and was an officer
of yet another charity, the Safa Trust. The U.S. government alleges that the Safa
Trust has been active in supporting terrorist activities.6'
Many of the organizations that operate under tax-exempt status in the U.S. but
have demonstrated relationships to terrorist organizations do some charitable
work in addition to their terrorism-sponsoring activities. For example, the al-
Wafa Humanitarian Organization, a Saudi charity, has been described as doing
"
3Hearings, supra note 39 (testimony of Steven Emerson).
54Mark Huband, Bankrolling bin Laden, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2002.5 When arrested at the Delhi train station, the suspected ringleader of the plot told police that he
had been working for the International Islamic Relief Organization. Dexter Filkins, Attacks on U.S.
Missions Foiled, Indian Police Say, Los ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 21, 1999, at A4.
56BMI's other investors included Mousa Abu Marzouk, a top Hamas leader. Glenn R. Simpson,
Report Links Charity to an al-Qaeda Front, supra note 47.57Simpson, supra note 39. Another company, Abrar Investments Inc., jointly invested more than
$2 million with the IIRO in a Chicago chemical company, Global Chemical. The president of Global
Chemical, Mohammed Mabrook, was a Libyan immigrant and Islamic activist who had worked for a
pro-Palestinian group headed by Mr. Marzouk, a leader of the Hamas terrorist organization with ties
to BMI. Two of the IIRO's top officials allegedly owned a total of a 20% percent interest in Global
Chemical. Id. (information taken from FBI affidavit).
58/d.
591d.
'See supra note 48.
6 Simpson, Report Links Charity to an al-Qaeda Front, supra note 47. See also Hearings, supra
note 39 (testimony of Matthew A. Levitt).
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"a small amount of legitimate humanitarian work and rais[ing] a lot of money
for equipment and weapons,"62 while it also has been described as "a key part of
Mr. bin Laden's organization."63 The Al Rashid Trust and Global Relief are
engaged in charitable relief work, yet also are suspected "here and abroad of
funneling money to al-Qaeda or other terrorist organizations. '" 61 The Al Rashid
Trust, a charitable organization with ties to al-Qaeda, had its assets frozen by
executive order in October 2001. The organization "proclaims having 'aided
widows and orphans of martyrs,' which many interpret as providing funds to the
families of suicide bombers and other terrorists."65 The Al Rashid Trust also has
been linked to the militant group whose members were convicted of the murder
of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in January 2002.66 As this material
makes clear, terrorist financing activities often may be masked by legitimate
humanitarian works carried on by these same organizations.67
While the relationship between the organizations discussed above and terror-
ism for the most part involves terrorist financing, the activities of a number of
U.S. charities apparently have gone beyond merely providing financial resources
to terrorist operations. The Mercy International Relief Organization, for ex-
ample, is said to have played a role in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies
in Nairobi and Tanzania, in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and in
planned bombings in Bosnia.68 L'Houssaine Khertchou, who was convicted of
the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Tanzania, testified
during his trial that in Nairobi, "al-Qaeda members there were 'dealing with'
Mercy International Relief Agency," and related how the organization assisted
both Muhammed Atef, the military training chief of al-Qaeda, and Osama bin
Laden.6 9 On Mercy International's payroll in Pakistan were relatives of Ramzi
Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.7" Relation-
62 Laurie P. Cohen, Glenn Simpson, Mark Maremont, and Peter Fritsch, Aiding and Abetting:
Bush's Financial War on Terrorism Includes Strikes at Islamic Charities, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25,
2001, at Al.6 31d.
'Schmitt, Kurlantzick and Smucker, supra note 45. Mr. Levitt stated that of the money raised by
the Global Relief Foundation, "much-perhaps most-of these funds likely went to legitimate
causes." Hearings, supra note 39 (testimony of Matthew A. Levitt).
65Schmitt, Kurlantzick and Smucker, supra note 45.
16Karl Vick and Kamran Khan, Officials Say Body Probably is Pearl's; New Suspect Claims he
Killed Reporter, WASH. POST, May 18, 2002, at AOl; see also Hearings, supra note 39 (testimony of
Matthew A. Levitt).
67Schmitt, Kurlantzick and Smucker, supra note 45.
6 The Levitt Testimony details the role played by the Mercy International Relief Organization in
the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings. See also Huband, supra note 54 (quoting the testimony of U.S.
prosecutors regarding Mercy International that it "had a legitimate charitable purpose, but it had
other purposes "'contrary to that"'); Hearings, supra note 39 (testimony of Steven Emerson) ("Mercy
International was one of the organizations that was used to support the network of Al Jihad when it
was conducting its operation against American embassies in East Africa when they were blown
up.").
69Huband, supra note 54.701d.
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ships have also been established between Mercy International and BMI, the
investment vehicle accused of funding the African embassy bombings.7'
The above excerpts from newspaper articles and other public documents,
while providing a small snapshot of the information available on charitable
organizations with ties to terrorism, amply demonstrate the extent to which
terrorist financiers have operated with impunity in the United States, taking
advantage of this country's freedoms, and effectively receiving indirect federal
government support for their heinous crimes and plots. Furthermore, the mate-
rial also demonstrates the difficulties the U.S. government faces in closing down
such organizations, even when there exists numerous pieces of evidence docu-
menting links between funds raised by an organization and terrorist activities.7"
B. Government Attempts to Date with Respect to Charitable Organizations
Supporting Terrorism
As a means of curtailing the activities of the types of organizations outlined
above, the primary weapon of the U.S. government has been the blocking of
assets, a tactic which it has used more aggressively since September 11, 2001.13
For example, shortly after September 11, the government froze the assets of 27
organizations it alleged were linked to al-Qaeda, including the al-Wafa Humani-
tarian Organization and the Al Rashid Trust. 4 On December 3, 2001, the gov-
ernment froze the assets of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Develop-
ment, and on December 14, 2001, it blocked the assets of the Benevolence
International Foundation, Inc. and Global Relief Foundation, Inc.75
The U.S. government's authority for issuing blocking orders such as the ones
detailed above is derived from an Executive Order issued by President Bush on
September 23, 2001. Pursuant to Executive Order 13,224 the President declared
a national emergency, by reason of the threat of continuing and immediate
attacks on the United States by foreign terrorists.76 The Executive Order states
that "because of the pervasiveness and expansiveness of the financial foundation
of foreign terrorists, financial sanctions may be appropriate for those foreign
persons that support or otherwise associate with these foreign terrorists."77 Ter-
7 Simpson, supra note 40; Huband, supra note 54.
"See, e.g., Simpson, Hesitant Agents: Why the FBI Took Nine Years to Shut Group It Tied to
Terror, supra note 48.
"The U.S. government also has prosecuted cases against individual officers of charities suspected
of involvement in terrorist activities. In February, 2003, for example, the U.S. obtained a guilty plea
from Enaam M. Arnaout, Executive Director of the Benevolence International Foundation, to a
racketeering charge, open the grounds that Mr. Arnaout had "fraudulently obtained charitable dona-
tions in order to provide financial assistance to persons engaged in violent activities overseas."
74Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (2001).
"Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treas. (Dec. 4, 2001) at http://www.treas.gov./press/releases/
po837.htm; supra note 40 (testimony of Matthew A. Levitt).
761d. at § 3(d) (entitled "Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons who Com-
mit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism").
77Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,079 (2001).
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rorism is defined for these purposes as an activity that involves a violent act or
an act dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure; and appears to be
intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of
a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a govern-
ment by mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking.78 Execu-
tive Order 13,224 blocks the assets of certain foreign persons and organizations,
and assets of persons that assist, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or
technological support for acts of terrorism or certain specified terrorist organiza-
tions or persons.79 The Executive Order also prohibits U.S persons from making
certain donations to such persons or organizations, as covered in the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). °
Executive Order 13,224 builds upon concepts enunciated in Executive Order
12,947, issued by President Clinton in 1995.1 Executive Order 12,947, entitled
"Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle
East Peace Process," was issued in response to the violent acts of terrorism that
the President found constituted "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the na-
tional security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. '8 2 Executive
781d. at § 3(d).
79Specifically, the Executive Order provides that the assets of the following are blocked:
(a) foreign persons listed in the Annex to this order;
(b) foreign persons determined by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secre-
tary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, to have committed, or to pose a significant
risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States;
(c) persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary
of State and the Attorney General, to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf
of those persons listed in the Annex to this order or those persons determined to be subject
to subsection l(b), 1(c), or l(d)(i) of this order;
(d) except as provided in section 5 of this order and after such consultation, if any, with
foreign authorities as the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Attorney General, deems appropriate in the exercise of his discretion,
persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of
State and the Attorney General; (i) to assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or
technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, such acts of
terrorism or those persons listed in the Annex to this order or determined to be subject to
this order; or (ii) to be otherwise associated with those persons listed in the Annex to this
order or those persons determined to be subject to subsection l(b), 1(c), or l(d)(i) of this
order.
Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
8
°Section (b)(2) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA") (50 U.S.C. §
1702(b)(2)) provides that generally the authority granted to the President by section 1702 does not
include the authority to regulate or prohibit "donations, by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, of articles, such as food, clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to relieve human
suffering, except to the extent that the President determines that such donations would seriously
impair his ability to deal with any national emergency ... or would endanger Armed Forces of the
United States which are engaged in hostilities or are in a situation where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances" (emphasis added).
8
'Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (Jan. 25, 1995).
82
1d.
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Order 12,947 blocks the assets of certain persons specified in an Annex to the
Order83 and of foreign persons designated by the Secretary of State, in coordina-
tion with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, who are found
to have committed certain prohibited acts, or to pose a significant risk of disrupt-
ing the Middle East peace process, or to assist in, sponsor or provide financial,
material, or technological support for, or services in support of, such acts of
violence; persons found to act for or on behalf of the above persons are also
subject to the Order. The Order further blocks all property and interests in
property subject to U.S. jurisdiction in which there is any interest of persons
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Secretary
of State and the Attorney General, to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or
on behalf of any other person designated pursuant to the Order (collectively
"Specially Designated Terrorists" or "SDTs"). Executive Order 12,947, like
Executive Order 13,224, specifically prohibits donations to the persons specified
in the Order.84
Regulations issued by the Treasury Department define SDTs to mean:
(1) Persons listed in the Annex to Executive Order 12,947;
(2) Foreign persons designated by the Secretary of State, in coordination with
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, because they are found:
(i) To have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of
violence that have the purpose or effect of disrupting the Middle East peace
process, or
(ii) To assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological sup-
port for, or services in support of, such acts of violence; and
(3) Persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with
the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to be owned or controlled by,
or to act for or on behalf of, any other specially designated terrorist.85
The regulations prohibit charitable contributions to or for the benefit of a
SDT, and provide that:
a contribution or donation is made to or for the benefit of a specially designated
terrorist if made to or in the name of a specially designated terrorist; if made to
or in the name of an entity or individual acting for or on behalf of, or owned or
controlled by, a specially designated terrorist; or if made in an attempt to
83Executive Order 13,099, 63 Fed. Reg. 45,167 (Aug. 20, 1998), amended Executive Order 12,947
on August 20, 1998, adding additional names to the list.
'Executive Order No. 13,224 and Executive Order No. 12,947 were issued partially under the
authority derived from the IEEPA. The IEEPA provides the President with the authority, in the
circumstance of an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has
been declared, to investigate, regulate, or prohibit, among other activities, transfers of credit or
payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or
payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof, and the importing or
exporting of currency or securities. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1702(a)(1), 1701.
8531 C.F.R. § 595.311.
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violate, to evade or to avoid the bar on the provision of contributions or dona-
tions to specially designated terrorists.16
The presidential authority with respect to the Executive Orders set forth above
is derived principally from the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (the Antiterrorism Act).87 The Antiterrorism Act, recognizing that "interna-
tional terrorism is a serious and deadly problem that threatens the vital interests
of the United States," was enacted to "provide the Federal Government the
fullest possible basis, consistent with the Constitution, to prevent persons within
the United States, or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, from provid-
ing material support or resources to foreign organizations that engage in terrorist
activities."88 The Antiterrorism Act makes it a crime to knowingly provide mate-
rial support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). 89 An FTO is
specifically defined by the Antiterrorism Act as a foreign organization desig-
nated as such by the Secretary of State, if the Secretary finds that the foreign
organization engages in terrorist activity9 and the terrorist activity of the organi-
zations threatens the security of the United States nationals or the national secu-
rity of the United States.9' The Antiterrorism Act also makes it a criminal of-
fense for U.S. persons to provide material support or resources to FTOs and
requires financial institutions to block all funds in which FTOs or their agents
have an interest.92
Terrorist activity is defined for these purposes as any activity which is unlaw-
ful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if committed in
the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any
State) and which involves the highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (in-
cluding an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle); the seizing or detaining, and threatening
to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another individual in order to compel a third
person (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any
act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or
detained; a violent attack upon an internationally protected person93 or upon the
8631 C.F.R. § 595.408.
87Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214-1319 (1996).
8818 U.S.C. § 2339B.
8918 U.S.C. § 2339B. The Antiterrorism Act also makes it a criminal offense generally for U.S.
persons to engage in financial transactions with the governments of certain countries designated as
supporting international terrorism. 18 U.S.C. § 2332d. The countries currently designated are Cuba,
Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. See Export Administration Act of 1979 § 6(j), 50
U.S.C. App. § 2405 (1979).
9°For these purposes, terrorist activity is defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B).
918 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(C).
9218 U.S.C. § 2339B. The term "material support or resources" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)
as "currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training,
expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equip-
ment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical
assets, except medicine or religious materials."
93See 18 U.S.C § 11 16(b)(4) (defining "internationally protected person").
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liberty of such a person; an assassination; the use of any-(a) biological agent,
chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or (b) explosive, firearm, or other
weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal monetary gain), with
intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or
to cause substantial damage to property; or a threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do
any of the foregoing."
The first designated FfOs were identified as such by Secretary of State Albright
in 1997.91 As of January 30, 2003, the number of designated FTOs stands at 36
and the U.S. government has named over 250 organizations and individuals as
financiers of terrorism. 96 Close to $125 million assets have been frozen world-
wide since September 11,2001, approximately $35 million in the U.S.97
The number of individuals and organizations, and the amounts involved, sug-
gest the practical and legal difficulties the government faces in acting under the
authorities set forth above. With respect to the Holy Land Foundation, for ex-
ample, despite evidence linking it to Hamas through the 1990s,98 the Foundation
was able to continue to operate and raise funds in the U.S. because of the
logistical hurdles involved in building a legal case around the relationship be-
tween the organization's funds and terrorist activities.99 The difficulty the gov-
ernment faced in shutting down an organization such as the Holy Land Founda-
918 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B). The statute defines the term "engage in terrorist activity" to mean in
an individual capacity or as a member of an organization-I. to commit or to incite to commit,
tinder circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist
activity; 2. to prepare or plan a terrorist activity; 3. to gather information on potential targets for
terrorist activity; 4. to solicit funds or other things of value for-(aa) a terrorist activity; (bb) a
terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(l) or (vi)(Il); or (cc) a terrorist organization described
in clause (vi)(11), unless the solicitor can demonstrate that he did not know, and should not reason-
ably have known, that the solicitation would further the organization's terrorist activity; 5. to solicit
any individual-(aa) to engage in conduct otherwise described in this clause; (bb) for membership in
a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(ll); or (cc) for membership in a terrorist
organization described in clause (vi)(II1), unless the solicitor can demonstrate that he did not know,
and should not reasonably have known, that the solicitation would further the organization's terrorist
activity; or 6. to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material
support, including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other
material financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, bio-
logical, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training-(aa) for the commission of a terrorist
activity; (bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably should know, has committed or
plans to commit a terrorist activity; (cc) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(1) or
(vi)(II); or (dd) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(11), unless the actor can demon-
strate that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the act would further the
organization's terrorist activity. Id.
"Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650 (Oct. 2, 1997).
961d.
97Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, Statement by the Treasury
Department Regarding Today's Designation of Two Leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah (Jan. 24, 2003), at
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/kd3796.htm.
9 See Simpson, supra note 48.
9 1d. See also Cohen, Simpson, Maremont and Fritsch, supra note 62 ("seven years of legal efforts
in U.S. courts to prove allegations that several Islamic charities were fronts for terrorist activities
have gone nowhere.").
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tion, despite nine years of surveillance and documented ties to terrorist organiza-
tions, demonstrates "the difficulties of rooting out terror financiers in an open
society that is hesitant to squelch political or religious advocacy."'"
III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The foregoing discussion makes several things quite clear. First, there is a
compelling national interest in precluding identified terrorists and their organi-
zations from using the freedoms this country traditionally supplies as a means of
fostering their unacceptable activities and purposes. Second, however, those
freedoms cannot be generally dispensed with in order to prevent such use. Third,
particularly where charitable organizations are concerned, it is necessary to sort
between the acceptable public benefits they provide and their activities that are
detrimental to the public good of this country. From the standpoint of the Code,
those benefits depend on the indirect subsidies supplied by sections 170 and
501(c)(3). The Service is well-positioned to take affirmative action to ensure
that U.S. taxpayer's dollars are not used to support improper activities, and it
can do so within the framework of existing law without impinging on the proper
entitlement of exempt organizations acting consistently in support of the public
good. Several proposals to that effect follow.
A. Issue Public Guidance Similar to Revenue Procedure 1975-50
The Service should use guidelines patterned on those set forth in Revenue
Procedure 1975-50, described in Part I, above, to prevent the abuse of our tax
system by domestic organizations that fund terrorist activities abroad. Under
Revenue Procedure 1975-50, the Service requires all educational institutions
seeking tax-exempt status to adopt and make public a policy of non-discrimina-
tion in their organizational documents. The Service should adopt similar require-
ments with respect to organizations seeking to qualify as charitable organiza-
tions that send money overseas. All such organizations should be required to
state that they have adopted a policy of not supporting terrorist activities, and to
publicize such statements, both in the general press and in brochures seeking
donations.'0' The Service should also apply record-keeping requirements similar
to those of Revenue Procedure 1975-50 to international charities, and all organi-
zations funding international activities should be required to keep copies of all
brochures and information demonstrating their compliance with a policy of non-
"°Simpson, Hesitant Agents: Why the FBI Took Nine Years to Shut Group it Tied to Terror, supra
note 48; see also Simpson, U.S. Knew of Terrorist, Charity Ties, supra note 38.
'Members of the ABA Tax Section have made a similar recommendation. See ABA Section of
Taxation Exempt Org. Comm., Comments Pursuant to Internal Revenue Service Announcement
2002-87, 2002-39 I.R.B. 624, on Form 990 Series Developments and Request for Comments Regard-
ing Possible Changes (Feb. I1, 2003), printed in TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 12, 2003) (suggesting
amendments to Form 990 that would ask tax-exempt organizations to obtain signed agreements from
foreign grantees "limiting the use of grant funds to purposes and activities within the scope of Code
Section 501(c)(3) and requiring the grantee to refrain from using the grant funds to support or
promote violence or terrorist organizations").
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support of terrorist activities (as described in greater detail below).
There are those who will argue that the proposal outlined above, requiring an
affirmation against the funding of terrorist activities, is tantamount to or may
ultimately lead to the conditioning of the grant of tax exemption on the expres-
sion of support for a current political regime, and that such a requirement would
constitute an impermissible infringement on the constitutional right of free speech.
In Speiser v. Randall,"2 the Supreme Court struck down as an impermissible
restriction on free speech a California law that conditioned the grant of a prop-
erty tax exemption upon the taxpayers' undertaking an oath that they did not
advocate the overthrow of the governments of California or the United States.
Although the Court acknowledged that speech can be "effectively limited by the
exercise of the taxing power,"' 3 it nevertheless concluded that, given the funda-
mental importance of the right, the method chosen by California imposed an
overly restrictive burden on the taxpayers' rights to free speech. The Court's
concern was that California's policy placed upon the taxpayers the burden of
demonstrating that they met the requirements for tax exemption; the Court held
that such an allocation of the burden of proof in a freedom of speech issue did
not meet the requirements of due process."° The Court found that because of the
important role of free speech in a democratic society, "[w]hen the State under-
takes to restrain unlawful advocacy it must provide procedures which are ad-
equate to safeguard against infringement of constitutionally protected rights.' 10 5
The oath required by the California government in Speiser differs from the
proposal outlined above in that the present proposal does not prohibit any indi-
vidual or organization from advocating any particular position vis-.-vis terrorist
activities and the overthrow of the U.S. government. Rather, the suggested Ser-
vice guidelines relate to the specific activities of the organization seeking tax
exemption. The distinction is between asking an organization to make a state-
ment regarding its beliefs, which imposes a restriction on free speech, and ask-
ing an organization to make a statement about its activities. The Courts' greatest
concern in this area appears to be focused on legislation that results in the
"suppression of dangerous ideas.""' 6 Asking an organization to make a statement
about whether it provides support to criminal activities does not interfere with
one's ability to speak freely. Another concern expressed by the Speiser Court,
the lack of a demonstrated nexus between the harm the government was attempt-
ing to address and the burdens imposed upon the individual's constitutional
rights, also distinguishes Speiser from the present proposal.0 7 As Part II indi-
cates, there is sufficient evidence to justify the government's attempt to withhold
102357 U.S. 513 (1958).
"I'Id. at 518 (citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)).
11
4Id. at 523, 528-29.
1051d. at 521.
'"Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959).
1°7"[W]e hold that when the constitutional right to speak is sought to be deterred by a State's
general taxing program due process demands that the speech be unencumbered until the State comes
forward with sufficient proof to justify its inhibition." Speiser, 357 U.S. 513, 528-29 (1958).
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tax exemption from organizations that fund terrorist activities as a serious threat
to government and national security. Thus, the above proposal differs from the
statement required of the taxpayer in Speiser because of the limited nature of the
prohibited practice, and the demonstrated connection between specific acts of
harm. Rather than a general prohibition against advocacy, the proposal addresses
a limited class of activities, and specified groups or individuals, whose activities
have been linked to mass murder and have as their aim the destruction of our
free society. Thus, the proposal should not fall into the category found unlawful
by the Court in Speiser.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has distinguished Speiser on numerous occa-
sions. In Regan v. Taxation With Representation,0° the Court upheld the Service's
denial of tax exemption to Taxation With Representation (TWR) under section
501(c)(3) on the grounds that a substantial part of TWR's activities would con-
sist of lobbying, which is not allowed under section 501(c)(3). TWR argued that
conditioning tax-exempt status upon the taxpayer's refraining from undertaking
lobbying activities constituted an impermissible restriction on its First Amend-
ment rights."C The Court rejected the taxpayer's argument, holding that the mere
refusal by Congress to subsidize the taxpayer's activities did not give the tax-
payer a constitutional claim, and that it had "never held that Congress must grant
a benefit . . . to a person who wishes to exercise a constitutional right."", In
several other cases, the Supreme Court has held that "a legislature's decision not
to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right.""'
As the district court for the District of Columbia stated in Green v. Connally,
"freedom from governmental 'regimentation' or interference is not to be equated
with a right of support."' 1 2
In the 1973 case of Norwood v. Harrison,"3 the Supreme Court drew the
distinction between the constitutional rights of individuals to organize to pro-
mote their goals, and any constitutional right such individuals may have to
mandate government support for those goals. In Norwood, parents of schoolchil-
108461 U.S. 540 (1982).
"°See Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 545.
' °d. See also id. at 551 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that "the First Amendment does not
require the Government to subsidize protected activity," and that the First Amendment issue in the
case was controlled by Cammarano rather than Speiser and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 592
(1972)).
"'Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1982). See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 316 (1980) (upholding constitutionality of law prohibiting use of federal funds for performance
of abortions, stating that "a woman's freedom of choice does [not] carr[y] with it a constitutional
entitlement to avail herself of the full range of protected choice"); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding the public election financing law and the
constitutionality of restrictions placed upon candidates' access to public election funding).
.
2Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1166 (D.D.C. 1971). "Freedom of association in political parties
is of zenith importance in our democracy, but certainly political parties and their sponsors have no
constitutional entitlement to government support, whether in the form of tax exemptions or deduc-
tions or otherwise." Id.
113413 U.S. 455 (1973) [hereinafter Norwood].
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dren in Mississippi sued the State of Mississippi to enjoin the enforcement of the
State's textbook lending program, which provided books to private schools without
investigating whether such schools pursued a policy of racial discrimination.
The State of Mississippi argued that striking down its textbook program would
constitute a violation of the equal protection rights of its citizens who were
entitled to send their children to a school of their choice. The Supreme Court
rejected that argument, distinguishing its earlier precedents, which had affirmed
the right of citizens to maintain private schools with "admission limited to
students of particular national origins, race, or religion.""' 4 The Court's state-
ments are instructive, and equally applicable to similar arguments that may be
made in the present context, namely that the requirement that exempt-organiza-
tions adopt a statement of nonsupport for terrorism would violate constitutional
rights:
In Pierce, the Court affirmed the right of private schools to exist and to operate;
it said nothing of any supposed right of private or parochial schools to share
with public schools in state largesse, on an equal basis or otherwise. It has
never been held that if private schools are not given some share of public funds
allocated for education that such schools are isolated into a classification viola-
tive of the Equal Protection Clause. It is one thing to say that a State may not
prohibit the maintenance of private schools and quite another to say that such
schools must, as a matter of equal protection, receive state aid. "5
The Norwood decision was predicated upon the analogy the Court drew be-
tween state tuition grants to students attending racially discriminatory private
schools and a textbook lending program, and its conclusion that a textbook
lending program, like a tuition grant, is a form of state subsidy that may be
restricted by the government without the infringement of constitutional rights." 6
Similarly, in Bob Jones University, the plaintiffs' racial-discriminatory policy
in their schools was based on their sincerely held religious beliefs. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court held that the denial of tax exemption did not interfere with
the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to the free exercise of their religious
beliefs, given the compelling government interests at stake. Recognizing that the
denial of tax benefits would have a substantial impact on the operation of these
schools, the Court nevertheless found that the governmental interest substan-
tially outweighed whatever burden the denial of tax exemption placed upon the
plaintiffs' exercise of their religious beliefs."' One may also argue that the
Court's decision in Bob Jones University, although it did not specifically con-
sider the validity of the requirements of Revenue Procedure 1975-50, gave an
'
4Norwood, 413 U.S. at 457 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
"I51d. at 462. See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 640 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(confirming validity of precedents holding that use of taxpayer funds to support parochial schools
violates the First Amendment).
"
6Norwood, 413 U.S. at 463 and cases cited therein.
'"See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983).
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implicit blessing to these guidelines by explicitly approving the Service's policy
and procedures in enforcing the policy of Revenue Ruling 1971-447. The pro-
posal outlined above should no more be considered a restriction on free speech
than such restrictions as may be imposed upon educational institutions under
Revenue Procedure 1975-50.
The court decisions, however, also point to the difficulty of setting forth
appropriate guidelines in this area, given the strong constitutional interests at
stake. In Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States,'"5 the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals overturned the district court's decision upholding the Service's denial
of tax exemption to Big Mama Rag, "a nonprofit organization with a feminist
orientation."''" The Service had determined that Big Mama Rag's activities of
publishing a newspaper were commercial in nature, and that neither the content
of the publication nor the distribution of the newspaper was "valuable in achiev-
ing an educational purpose."' 2 The relevant regulations at the time provided that
an organization may be educational even though it advocates a particular posi-
tion or viewpoint, so long as it presents a sufficiently full and fair exposition of
the pertinent facts as to permit an individual or the public to form an indepen-
dent opinion or conclusion. 2 ' The Service found that Big Mama Rag failed to
meet the criteria of educational as then defined in its regulations because its
"doctrinaire" stance failed to provide a "sufficiently full and fair exposition of
the pertinent facts as to permit an individual or the public to form an indepen-
dent opinion or conclusion."'' 22 In overturning the lower court's decision, the
court of appeals cited approvingly to Speiser for the proposition that "although
First Amendment activities need not be subsidized by the state, the discrimina-
tory denial of tax exemptions can impermissibly infringe free speech."'23 Due to
those concerns, the court found that the regulations defining "educational" were
impermissibly vague and therefore violated the First Amendment. 2
4
Big Mama Rag is indicative of the courts' concerns regarding the impact of
the tax laws on constitutional values, and the harsh scrutiny to which tax laws
that impact on constitutional concerns are subject. It also indicates to the Service
the perils of attempting to regulate in areas at the intersection of the tax law with
constitutional law. Similarly, recognizing that a trust that violates public policy
"'631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
1 1d. at 1032.
t201d. at 1033 n.4. The Service's National Office denied tax-exempt status on three grounds: "I.
the commercial nature of the newspaper: 2. the political and legislative commentary found through-
out: and 3. the articles, lectures, editorials. etc.. promoting lesbianism." Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d at
1033 n.2.
'
21Reg. § 1.501 (c)(3)- I (d)(3)(i)(1959).
2
'Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Reg. § 1.501 (c)(3)- I (d)(3)(i) (1959).
"-
3Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d at 1034.
'
24
"What makes an exposition 'full and fair"? Can it be 'fair' without being 'full'? Which facts are
pertinent'? How does one tell whether an exposition of the pertinent facts is 'sufficient ... to permit
an individual or the public to form an independent opinion or conclusion'? And who is to make all of
these determinations?" Id. at 1037.
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is illegal, the commentators have acknowledged the subjectivity of this notion' 25
Nevertheless, the close ties between the identified harm and the government's
remedy in the present case should prevent application of the type of analysis
employed by the court in Big Mama Rag. In addition, the support of terrorist
activities, no less than racial discrimination, "violates a most fundamental na-
tional public policy, as well as rights of individuals."'26 In Norwood, the Court
distinguished between a private parochial school, which may receive certain
forms of state aid without violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment, and racially discriminatory private schools, regarding which it found that
"the legitimate educational function cannot be isolated from discriminatory prac-
tices."'27 A requirement that organizations benefiting from the support of our
government through their tax-exempt status publicly renounce the support of
terrorist activities compromises no one's right to free speech, but simply ensures
that such beliefs will not be supported by taxpayer dollars.
B. Require More Information on Form 990
As described in Part II, above, U.S. law already identifies a class of organiza-
tions to which the provision of material support (defined to include financial
support) is illegal. Furthermore, the government specifically has designated iden-
tifiable organizations as financiers of terrorism pursuant to executive orders and
Treasury Department regulations. Form 990 should provide more specific ques-
tions to ensure that no funding from domestic tax-exempt organizations is chan-
neled to such designated organizations.
Form 990 is a required filing for most non-profit organizations claiming tax-
exempt status under section 501(c)(3). Section 6033, which sets forth the statu-
tory obligation to file the Form 990, generally provides that:
every organization exempt from taxation under section 501(a) shall file an
annual return, stating specifically the items of gross income, receipts, and dis-
bursements, and such other information for the purpose of carrying out the
internal revenue laws as the Secretary may by forms or regulations prescribe,
and shall keep such records, render under oath such statements, make such
other returns, and comply with such rules and regulations as the Secretary may
from time to time prescribe.
Form 990 asks the organization questions regarding its finances and adminis-
tration, about any relationships it may have with tax-exempt organizations not
described in section 501(c)(3), and for other information designed to ensure that
individuals connected to the charity are not the recipient of excess benefits from
'
25See AUSTIN WAKEMAN Scoj-r, IV THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 377 (3d ed. 1967) ("Questions of public
policy are not fixed and unchanging, but vary from time to time and from place to place. A trust fails
for illegality if the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust is regarded as against public policy in
the community in which the trust is created and at the time when it is created"); see also Bob Jones
Univ., 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983) ("The institution's purpose must not be so at odds with the common
community conscience as to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be conferred.").
Q
6Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 593.
'Norwood, 413 U.S. 455, 468-69 (1973).
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the charity.'28
On September 4, 2002, the Service issued a request for comments on pro-
posed changes to Form 990.129 In it, the Service specifically asked for comments
with respect to changes that would more effectively identify on Form 990 trans-
actions that present a risk of the diversion of charitable funds, in response to the
concern that "has been expressed that purportedly charitable organizations may
be transferring funds outside the United States to organizations or individuals
suspected of supporting terrorist activities."'3 ° To that end, a new Part VIII
should be added to Schedule A of Form 990.
Schedule A of Form 990 requires additional supplementary information from
section 501(c)(3) organizations. Some of the information requested is required
of all section 501(c)(3) organizations, to enable the Service to make a determina-
tion that non-private foundation status does not apply to the organization. Other
information is requested only of particular types of organizations. Notably, Part
V only applies to private schools, and asks for information regarding whether
the organization has complied with the policies of Revenue Procedure 1975-50,
and whether the organization has maintained records to demonstrate the racial
composition of the school and the racial discrimination policy as evidenced in
brochures and other material intended to solicit students and provide information
about the school.' 3'
A new series of questions, in a new section of Form 990, should pose screen-
ing questions of charitable organizations that send money abroad, similar to
those applicable to educational institutions. As a preliminary matter, Form 990
should ask what percent of an organization's funds are sent (i) directly abroad;
and (ii) to organizations that had as their stated purpose charitable efforts abroad.
Schedule A then should require organizations that sent more than a specified
threshold of money abroad to answer additional questions. To the extent that
2
'See generally BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIoS, 868-1st T.M., Tax Issues of Religious Orga-
nizations, 868-1st T.M. IV-B.
2
'Announcement 2002-87, 2002-39 I.R.B. 624 (Sept. 4, 2002). Since then, the Service also has
requested comments on revising various other aspects of tax forms and regulations that would
improve oversight of charitable organizations. In Announcement 2002-92, 2002-41 I.R.B. 709 (Oct.
15, 2002), the Service asked for comments on changes to Form 1023; and in Announcement 2003-
29; 2003-29 I.R.B. I (May 2, 2003), the Service announced that it was considering new guidance to
clarify standards and requirements for international grant-making and international activities.
'
3 Announcement 2002-87.
'
31Form 990, Schedule A, generally requires the following information to be provided by private
schools claiming tax-exempt status: whether the organization has a racially nondiscriminatory policy
toward students evidenced by statements in its charter, bylaws, other governing instrument; whether
the organization includes a statement of its racially nondiscriminatory policy in its brochures, cata-
logues, and other written communications; whether the organization has publicized its racially non-
discriminatory policy through newspaper or broadcast media; and whether the organization main-
tains records indicating the racial composition of the student body, faculty, and administrative staff
and documenting that scholarships and other financial assistance are awarded on a racially nondis-
criminatory basis. Form 990 also requires an organization to certify that it has complied with the
applicable requirements of sections 4.01 through 4.05 of Revenue Procedure 1975-50, 1975-2 C.B.
587, covering racial nondiscrimination.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 56, No. 4
SECTION OF TAXATION
guidelines similar to the ones in Revenue Procedure 1975-50 are adopted, Sched-
ule A could ask whether those guidelines have been followed. Additionally,
Schedule A should ask whether (i) any funds go to organizations that have been
named as a SDTG; (ii) any funds have gone to individuals who have been
affiliated with an SDTG; and (iii) any funds have gone to an organization estab-
lished to have a link to an SDTG, or engaged in terrorist activities.
The general Form 990 asks for a list of officers and directors of the section
501(c)(3) organization. Schedule A should ask the organizations specified above
for additional information about their officers and directors, such as whether any
of those individuals have ever been affiliated with an SDTG. Schedule A also
should require the organization to certify to that effect. Finally, Schedule A
should ask whether the organization has ever been the recipient of a request for
information from the U.S. government in connection with alleged affiliations
with SDTGs.
It is quite possible that organizations involved in legitimate international hu-
manitarian works may protest the above proposal as imposing overly burden-
some requirements upon their good works. 32 Organizations involved in terrorist
financing, the argument goes, are unlikely to provide any helpful information in
response to the proposed questions, and the proposal therefore will result in
unproductive and burdensome reporting requirements on organizations that are
trying to help the needy with budgets that always fall short.'33 Such organiza-
tions may argue that the expenditure reporting requirements imposed by section
4945 already pose far too great a burden on those engaged in charitable efforts,
and that any additional requirements will further hinder the efforts to help the
indigent peoples of the world. Admittedly, these claims have some merit, but
they are outweighed by the seriousness of the problem of the abuse of our
current system by terrorist financiers. Because of the documented evidence re-
garding the use of our system of tax exemption by terrorist-funding organiza-
tions, in granting tax exemption to organizations involved in international chari-
table efforts, the government must weigh the humanitarian needs of the poor of
the world against the safety of its own citizens and the survival of its state.
132The Independent Sector, a coalition of 700 national nonprofit philanthropic organizations, has
already made a public statement in opposition to such a proposal. See Independent Sector, Comments
in Response to Announcement 2002-87 (Feb. 1, 2003), printed in TAx Nori-s TODAY (Feb. 12, 2003):
We oppose requiring separate schedules for grants made to foreign recipients and impos-
ing any other additional reporting obligations on exempt organizations with foreign opera-
tions, foreign grant-making programs and other types of business relationships with for-
eign parties. While we understand the interest in protecting against the risk that exempt
organizations' funds could be diverted for terrorist or other inappropriate activities, we do
not believe that there is any basis for the IRS to impose such significant burdens on all
exempt organizations that have ties to foreign countries. Despite the large scale of US
charities' activities in foreign countries-from aid and missionary organizations to univer-
sity branches and scientific research organizations-and the substantial amount of U.S.
charities' expenditures in foreign countries, there is no evidence to indicate widespread
abuse of such funds for terrorist purposes.
1
33
1,1.
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Surely, in such a balance, the government's need to combat worldwide terrorism
directed at U.S. citizens and interests outweighs the burden additional reporting
obligations may impose upon legitimate charities. Furthermore, the need to be
more circumspect in their financial dealings and the information reporting re-
quirements may make it more difficult for some organizations that otherwise
would operate easily under tax-exempt status to finance terrorist activities, and
may require that their attempts to do so are undertaken without the support of
U.S. taxpayers. Finally, at a minimum, the violent acts accomplished and pro-
posed by these groups mandate that the U.S. government take some active and
public steps to attempt to restrict the benefits provided to such organizations by
our system of tax exemption.
Admittedly, there are practical considerations involved in this proposal in
connection with the burdens it would impose upon the Service. Given that the
Exempt Organizations Division is already severely limited in its ability to per-
form its primary function of tax determination and collection, there exists an
argument that the Service should not be involved in anti-terrorist battles. Never-
theless, the fact that the Exempt Organizations Division may not presently be
equipped for oversight of terrorist financing such consideration does not miti-
gate the fact that in allowing a tax benefit to organizations in the form of tax
exemption, the government has an obligation to make sure that this benefit is not
abused, and to organize its administrative capabilities accordingly.
C. Legislative Changes
The Service's authority to undertake such regulatory changes specifically is
provided by Executive Order 13,224, which directs the Secretary of the Treasury
to promulgate rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the
President by statute as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Execu-
tive Order. Furthermore, the Service's authority to respond to "changing condi-
tions and new problems" in its interpretation of the Code was recognized by the
Supreme Court in Bob Jones University, when the Court explicitly rejected the
plaintiff's claim that the Service exceeded its authority in the promulgation of
Revenue Ruling 1971-447.134
Nevertheless, in response to those who would argue that the Service lacks the
authority to adopt the policies outlined above without specific legislative guide-
lines, section 501 should be amended to make Congress' intent clear in this
regard. Such legislative changes would not be unprecedented. Section 501 has
been amended over the years to specifically enumerate certain organizations that
should be considered as having a charitable purpose. In addition, section 503(a)
provides for the denial of exemption to certain organizations. Section 503(a)
also could be amended to deny exemption to organizations that fund terrorist
activities.
"3Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1983). But see id. at 622 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Congress' failure to legislatively deny tax-exemption to educational institutions that
practice racial discrimination prevents the Service and the Court from adopting such a policy).
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Similar legislative proposals have been made in both the House and the Sen-
ate. The Care Act of 2003, passed by the Senate on April 9, 2003, provides for
an amendment to section 501 that would suspend the tax-exempt status of an
otherwise qualifying tax-exempt organization once the organization has been
designated as a terrorist organization or supporter of terrorism. The provision
also makes such an organization ineligible to apply for tax exemption under
section 501(a).' 35 The House has introduced a similar measure.'36
Congress' legislative mandate also may be derived from the Financial Action
Task Force on Money Laundering, which on October 31, 2001, at a special
plenary meeting, issued Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, which
included the following statement:
Countries should review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to
entities that can be abused for the financing of terrorism. Non-profit organiza-
tions are particularly vulnerable, and countries should ensure that they cannot
be misused:
i. by terrorist organisations posing as legitimate entities; ii. to exploit legiti-
mate entities as conduits for terrorist financing, including for the purpose of
escaping asset freezing measures; and iii. to conceal or obscure the clandestine
diversion of funds intended for legitimate purposes to terrorist organisations 37
Furthermore, Congress should amend section 6033 to specify additional infor-
mation to be required of a section 501(c)(3) organization in its annual filing on
Form 990. In section 6033, Congress provided a detailed list of the information
it requires from charitable organizations on an annual basis.'38 Although the
statute also gives the Service discretion to require additional information and
'
35See The Care Act of 2003 § 208, S. 476 (Apr. 9, 2003); Joint Comm. On Taxation, Technical
Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of S. 476, The Care Act of 2003 (May 12, 2003). Specifi-
cally, the bill denies tax exempt status to any organization designated under section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(1I)
or 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act as a terrorist organization or foreign terrorist organi-
zation; in or pursuant to an Executive Order related to terrorism and issued under the authority of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act or section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act
of 1945 for the purpose of imposing on such organization an economic or other sanction; or, in
certain cases, pursuant to an Executive Order.
'
36See section 102 of H.R. 1308, The Tax Relief, Simplification, and Equity Act of 2003 (Mar. 19,
2003). See also the Anti-Terrorism Charity Protection Act, introduced by Hon. Steve Israel of New
York on December 20, 2001. H.R. 3583, 1071h Cong., 1" Sess. (Dec. 20, 2001). Rep. Israel's bill
would amend section 501 by adding an additional paragraph specifically denying tax-exemption to
any organization if "any funds of such organization are used to support, or any activities of the
organization consist of providing support to, terrorists or terrorist organizations."
'
37http://www I .oecd.org/fatf.
3
'The statute enumerates 13 specific items of information that must be provided, including the
organization's gross income for the year; its expenses attributable to such income and incurred
within the year; its disbursements within the year for the purposes for which it is exempt; the
respective amounts (if any) of the taxes imposed on the organization, or any organization manager of
the organization, during the taxable year under any of the following provisions (and the respective
amounts (if any) of reimbursements paid by the organization during the taxable year with respect to
taxes imposed on any such organization manager under section 4911, section 4912, and section
4955; and such information as the Secretary may require with respect to any excess benefit transac-
tion (as defined in section 4958). See I.R.C. § 6033(b).
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provides that the annual filing must include "such other information for pur-
poses of carrying out the internal revenue laws as the Secretary may require,"' 39
a more specific requirement by Congress would provide insulation from a later
attack on the validity of the Service's actions.
IV. CONCLUSION
There exist numerous organizations that have claimed tax-exempt status under
our income tax laws, and have used the resulting privileged status to support
terrorist organizations that have as their fundamental creed the destruction of the
United States. There is no justification for the continued use of U.S. taxpayer
dollars to subsidize the activities of those who wish to destroy it. Organizations
that finance terrorism obviously do not benefit the general public, and clearly
violate established public policy. They should not be entitled to tax exemption
under the Code.
To combat the financiers of terror operating through tax-exempt entities in
this country, the Service should impose informational requirements on charitable
organizations that send money abroad, similar to the requirements imposed upon
educational institutions. That information should identify the foreign recipients
of the funds, including details about the individuals governing or playing a
significant role in any such recipient organizations. In 1982 the Supreme Court,
in upholding the Service's ability to deny tax exemption to two schools with
racially discriminatory policies, stated that "there can no longer be any doubt
that racial discrimination in education violates deeply and widely accepted views
of elementary justice."'40 Similarly, there can no longer be any doubt that orga-
nizations that fund terrorism seek to violate the most precious rights of life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The Service should implement better proce-
dures to prevent taxpayer dollars from being used to support them.
1391.R.C. § 6033(b)(14).
4 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983).
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